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The Iranian economy is highly vulnerable to oil price fluctuations. This paper analyzes the dynamic relationship 
between oil price shocks and major macroeconomic variables in Iran by applying a VAR approach. The study points 
out the asymmetric effects of oil price shocks; for instance, positive as well as negative oil price shocks significantly 
increase inflation. We find a strong positive relationship between positive oil price changes and industrial output 
growth. Unexpectedly, we can only identify a marginal impact of oil price fluctuations on real government expendi- 
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Oil and gas revenues play strategic roles in the structure of the Iranian economy.
Holding 10% of the world's total proven oil reserves and as the second largest pro-
ducer (after Saudi Arabia) within the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
(see OPEC (2005)), Iran both a®ects the international oil market and is broadly af-
fected by it. Iran's economy relies heavily on crude oil export revenues, representing
about 90% of total export earnings and, on average, 60% of government revenues
in annual budgets (Central Bank of Iran (2008)). The share of oil value added in
the GDP of Iran averaged about 20% between 1970 and 2006. In this situation, any
shock to global oil markets can have a tremendous e®ect on the government budget
and the structure of the economy. Figure 1 (source: Central Bank of Iran (2008)
and IFS-Database) illustrates the co-movement of the Iranian GDP per capita with
°uctuations of real oil prices since 1970. We can observe that the former variable is
linked to trend of the latter.
Fig. 1. The co-movement between GDP per capita and oil price
The unique role of oil revenues in the structure of government budgets and social
security programs distinguishes the Iranian economy from others. Despite higher oil
prices and revenues in recent years, the Iranian government budget de¯cits are still
a challenging issue, in part due to the large scale of state subsidies on energy and
comestible goods. Possible sources of ¯nancing the annual budget de¯cits include
issuing state bonds, foreign borrowing, privatization, and withdrawals from the Oil
Stabilization Fund (OSF). The shares of various sources of ¯nancing the budget
de¯cits in Iran over 2005 to 2007 are presented in table 1. As is evident from this table,
more than 90% of annual budget de¯cits in Iran is ¯nanced through withdrawals from
OSF. This is like spending oil revenues directly and has strong in°ationary e®ects
through increasing money supply in the economy. Considering the high rigidity of
2current government expenditures in Iran, any signi¯cant negative oil price shocks
will worsen the budget de¯cit of the government and create in°ationary pressures




budget actual budget actual budget actual
State bond 3.2% 3.3% 5.4% 0% 6.2% 0%
Foreign borrowing 2.1% 0% 3.2% 0% 2.8% 0.4%
Privatization 30.9% 0.4% 4.8% 0.2% 26.4% 1.7%
Oil Stabilization Fund 57.5% 87.2% 82.7% 96.3% 62.0% 94.0%
Others 6.2% 9.1% 3.9% 3.5% 2.6% 3.9%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Source: Survey of the Iranian Economy, Karafarin Bank, Online E-library
Thus, it appears that oil price changes highly in°uence the welfare and subsidization
programs of the government. Subsidies on gasoline and other essential products are
part of income redistribution programs. 1 In recent years, the average share of total
subsidies in annual state budgets reached about 10%. Figure 2 shows the share of
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Fig. 2. Share of subsidies in state budget
Besides the e®ects of oil price °uctuations on state welfare programs, the other
important aspect of vulnerability of the Iranian economy can be observed in the
appreciation of the exchange rate during oil price booms, leading to a contraction
1 Subsidies on gasoline are de¯ned as the di®erence between import prices of gasoline and
domestic prices. It is important to note that some kinds of subsidies, such as subsidies on
gasoline, are implicit subsides and are not transparent within annual budgets.
3Fig. 3. Co-movement of real oil price and real e®ective exchange rate
of the tradable sector. Figure 3 (source: IFS-Database) shows the co-movement of
the real oil price and the real e®ective exchange rates since 1995. This phenomenon
is known as "Dutch disease" 2 (see, e.g., Corden and Neary (1982), Corden (1984)
or van Wijnbergen (1984)). This e®ect, combined with the proposition that the
tradable sector (usually manufacturing) generates lager growth e®ects. This leads to
the conclusion that natural resource ownership exerts a drag on long run growth. This
phenomenon is not limited to Iran, but has also a®ected other main oil exporters.
Table 2 illustrates the overall economic performance of key oil rich countries in
comparison with control groups.
Given the high degree of dependence on oil revenues, a comprehensive analysis that
considers the main transmission channels of oil price shocks on the Iranian economy is
vital. This paper is one of only a handful of studies on a developing, net oil exporting
economy. The e®ects of oil price shocks are analyzed in three di®erent channels: the
supply side, the demand side, and the terms of trade.
Our main results for the period 1989:I{2006:IV on the supply side of economy reveal
that positive oil price shocks stimulate Iranian industrial production 3 and real im-
ports. On the other hand, negative shocks on oil prices undermine the process of real
industrial production and play a signi¯cant role in lowering the real level of imports.
2 Dutch disease is the standard example of the Paradox of Plenty. In the 1970s, large
revenues to the Dutch state from the extraction of natural gas led to the temptation to
build a welfare state that was unsustainable in the long run. The competitive ability of the
private sector was reduced and the industrial sector experienced a setback from which it
took many years to recover. In the case of oil exporting countries, this is even more likely
because abundant petroleum revenues change the calculations of even the most prudent
rulers, thus making learning more di±cult, not only between countries but also within
them.
3 The same results were obtained in the case of using real GDP per capita instead of real
industry value added GDP per capita.
4Table 2
Comparative economic performance of selected oil exporters (1975-2004)
gdp per capita in* growth rate** gdp per capita





Iran 6984 6916 -0.03% 7976 1976
Kuwait 27760 17815 -1.52% 27760 1975
Saudi Arabia 21591 12706 -1.81% 23265 1977
Out of MENA oil exporters
Nigeria 922 1061 0.48% 1061 2004
Mexico 6298 9010 1.75% 9046 2000
Venezuela 7103 5544 -0.84% 7587 1977
Comparators
East Asia & Paci¯c 806 4920 6.44% 4920 2004
South Asia 1101 2635 3.06% 2635 2004
World 4835 8187 1.83% 8187 2004
Source: World Bank (2006) and own calculations, Note: * in US Dollar (PPP, 2000), ** com-
pounding geometric growth rate, MENA is the abbreviation for Middle East and North Africa
countries
On the demand side, both positive and negative oil price shocks have in°ationary
e®ects and drive up the general level of prices, which translate into lower real dis-
posable incomes and a reduction in the real e®ective demand of Iranian consumers.
Another unexpected ¯nding is the response of government expenditures to oil price
changes. We can identify only a marginal impact of oil price °uctuation on real
government expenditures. The third main result of our paper is on terms of trade.
Increasing oil prices improves the terms of trade and appreciates the real e®ective
exchange rate. The response of the exchange rate to positive shocks is signi¯cantly
positive, and increasing in the short and midterm. At the same time, negative shocks
cause signi¯cantly negative responses in the real e®ective exchange rate, increasing
competitiveness of the tradable Iranian goods in international markets. In addition
to the evaluation of impulse response analyses, we have carried out variance decom-
position analyses to illustrate the contribution of oil price shocks to °uctuations of
major macroeconomic variables in Iran. Studying the e®ects of asymmetric changes
in real oil prices can be a step forward in understanding the Achilles' heel of the
Iranian economy and in ¯lling the existing gap in the empirical literature regarding
the macroeconomics of oil in developing and net oil exporting countries.
In the next section, we brie°y review the existing literature covering the oil price
macroeconomic relationship. In the third section, the data and the VAR methodology
will be discussed. In section four, the empirical ¯ndings, the discussion of results and
robustness tests are presented. Finally, section ¯ve summarizes the main ¯ndings.
52 Previous literature
The important role of crude oil in the global economy has attracted a great deal
of attention among politicians and economists. Researchers have focused on study-
ing the impacts of crude oil price shocks mainly within developed, net oil-importing
economies. However, explicit studies on net oil exporters have been rare so far. In
an international context, oil price shocks may have a di®erent impact depending
on countries' sectoral compositions, their institutional structures and their economic
development. 4 Researchers have focused on analyzing the relationship between oil
price changes and macroeconomic variables such as output growth, employment,
wages and in°ation. As we will see, the literature is still far from reaching a consen-
sus. In the following section, we will review some selected studies on industrial and
developing economies.
2.1 Industrial economies
There are several studies addressing the question of whether there is a relationship
between oil price shocks and macroeconomic key variables. Pioneering work on oil
price e®ects carried out by Darby (1982) and Hamilton (1983) focused on the US
economy. While Darby was not able to identify a signi¯cant relationship between oil
prices and macroeconomic variables, Hamilton found that oil price shocks were an
important factor in almost all US recessions from 1949 to 1973. He concludes that
changes in oil prices Granger-caused changes in unemployment and GNP in the US
economy.
Following Hamilton (1983) the literature for net oil importing countries raises two
fundamental questions. First, is the relationship between oil prices and economic
output stable over time? Second, does an asymmetric relationship exist between oil
price changes and economic activity?
In considering the ¯rst question, studies e.g. Burbidge and Harrison (1984), Gisser
and Goodwin (1986), Hooker (1996), Rotemberg and Woodford (1996) and Schmidt
and Zimmermann (2007) have shown that for several industrial countries, oil price
shocks have a signi¯cant negative impact on industrial production. However, they
all concluded that oil price changes have di®erent impacts on economies over time.
It seems evident that the e®ects of oil price movements have weakened during the
eighties.
4 See Cunado and de Garcia (2004) for a similar view.
6Recently, Blanchard and Gali (2007) examined and compared the current response of
in°ation and output in a group of industrialized economies to those of the 1970s. They
concluded that the main reasons behind the weak response of economies in recent
years is smaller energy intensity, a more °exible labor market, and improvements in
monetary policies.
In considering the second question, Mork (1989) proposes an asymmetric de¯nition
of oil prices and distinguishes between positive and negative oil price changes. He
de¯nes oil price changes as follows: 5
roilpt+ = max(0;(roilpt ¡ roilpt¡1)) (1)
roilpt¡ = min(0;(roilpt ¡ roilpt¡1)) (2)
where roilpt is the log of real oil price in time t. Mork showed that there is an
asymmetry in the responses of macroeconomic variables to oil price increases and
decreases. He concluded that positive oil price changes have a strongly negative and
signi¯cant relationship with changes in real GNP while negative oil price changes
exhibit no signi¯cant e®ects. For more comprehensive details on asymmetric e®ects
of oil prices see Mork (1994).
Hamilton (1996) suggested another form of asymmetric transformation of real oil
prices. Hamilton stated that most of the oil price increases are simply corrections
of earlier declines. He argued that if researchers want to measure how unsettling an
increase in the prices of oil is likely to be for the spending decision of consumers and
¯rms, it seems more appropriate to compare the current price of oil with that during
the previous year rather than during the previous quarter alone (see Hamilton (1996),
p. 216). Hamilton thus proposed using the percentage change over the previous year's
maximum if the oil price of the current quarter exceeds the value of the preceding
four quarters' maximum. If the price of oil in t is lower than in the previous year,
the noilp+ is de¯ned to be zero in quarter t. In this case no positive oil price shocks
have occurred.
noilpt+ = max[0;((roilpt) ¡ max((roilpt¡1);:::;(roilpt¡4))] (3)
noilpt¡ = min[0;((roilpt) ¡ min((roilpt¡1);:::;(roilpt¡4))] (4)
In his study, net nominal oil price increases are signi¯cant in explaining growth in
the real GDP of the US. Hamilton (2003) asserted that "Oil price increases are
5 Mork does not use real oil prices in absolute terms. Instead he uses several producer
price indices for crude oil. For a more detail description see Mork (1989), p. 741.
7much more important than oil price decreases, and increases have signi¯cantly less
predictive content if they simply correct earlier decreases" (Hamilton (2003), p. 363).
Lee, Ni and Raati (1995) pointed to the volatile nature of oil prices since the big
decline in 1986 and concluded that Mork's (1989) method of separating positive and
negative e®ects does not reveal a strong e®ect of oil price shock on real GNP growth
for the sample up to 1992. If oil prices are volatile in nature, economic agents will
expect an increase in prices to be reversed in a short time. They used a GARCH-
model in order to extract conditional variance from real oil price changes. They
concluded that positive oil price shocks are signi¯cantly negatively correlated with
real GNP growth, but negative oil price shocks are not. In the same vein, Elder and
Serletis (2006) showed that uncertainty about oil prices has a negative and signi¯cant
e®ect on industrial production.
Recently, Jimenez-Rodriguez and Sanchez (2005) assessed empirically the e®ects of
oil price shocks on real economic activities in a sample of seven OECD countries,
Norway and the Euro area as a whole. They carried out a multivariate VAR analysis
using both symmetric and asymmetric models. Jimenez-Rodrigez and Sanchez con-
cluded that oil price increases have a larger impact on GDP growth than oil price
declines. They emphasized the di®erence between oil importing and oil exporting
countries. Among oil importers, oil price increases have a signi¯cant negative impact
on economic activity, but for oil exporting countries, the e®ect is ambiguous.
For a comprehensive survey of recent developments on the relationship between oil
price shocks and the macroeconomy in industrial countries, see Jones et al. (2004).
2.2 Developing economies
Despite the main focus of research directed towards net oil importers and developed
economies, some recent studies have examined the e®ects of oil price changes on the
macroeconomy of developing economies. In this literature, net oil exporting countries
are the center of interest.
Eltony and Al-Awadi (2001) found evidence that symmetric oil price shocks are
important in explaining °uctuations in macroeconomic variables in Kuwait. Their
results showed the importance of oil price shocks on government expenditures, which
are the major determinant for the level of economic activity in Kuwait.
Raguindin and Reyes (2005) examined the e®ects of oil price shocks on the Philippine
economy over the period of 1981 to 2003. Their impulse response functions for the
8symmetric transformation of oil prices showed that an oil price shock leads to a pro-
longed reduction in the real GDP of the Philippines. Conversely, in their asymmetric
VAR model, oil price decreases play a greater role in each variable's °uctuations than
oil price increases.
Anshasy et al. (2005) examined the e®ects of oil price shocks on Venezuela's economic
performance over 1950 to2001. They investigated the relationship between oil prices,
governmental revenues, government consumption spending, GDP and investment by
employing a general to speci¯c modeling (VAR and VECM). They found two long
run relations consistent with economic growth and ¯scal balance. Furthermore, they
found that this relationship is important not only for the long run performance but
also for short-term °uctuations.
Berument and Ceylan (2005) studied the e®ects of symmetric oil price shocks on
output (proxied by industrial production) for a group of Middle East and North
African countries, including Iran. They estimate several VAR models for each of
these countries by using annual data over the period of 1960 to 2003. Their impulse
response analysis suggest that the e®ects of world oil price on GDP of Algeria, Iraq,
Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Syria, Tunisia and UAE are positive and statistically
signi¯cant. For Bahrain, Egypt, Lebanon, Morocco and Yemen they found in majority
positive but not signi¯cant results. For Iran, the estimated impulse response of output
to a shock in oil prices is contemporaneously signi¯cant and positive. We extent this
analysis by using higher frequency data, using a higher dimension VAR models and
considering possible asymmetric e®ects of oil price changes.
Olomola and Adejumo (2006) examined the e®ects of oil price shocks on output,
in°ation, real exchange rate and money supply in Nigeria using quarterly data from
1970 to 2003. Using VAR methodology they found that oil price shocks do not
have any substantial e®ect on output and in°ation. Oil price shocks signi¯cantly
determine the real exchange rate and signi¯cantly a®ect the money supply in the
long run. Olomola and Adejumo conclude that this may squeeze the tradable sector,
giving rise to the Dutch disease.
Our analysis aims not only to examine the symmetric and asymmetric e®ects of oil
price shocks on the Iranian economy, but also to trace their e®ects over di®erent time
periods.
93 Data and methodology
3.1 Data
In our analysis, we make use of six macroeconomic variables: real industrial GDP
per capita (rgdpi), real public consumption expenditures (rgex), real imports (rimp),
real e®ective exchange rate (reex), in°ation (inf ) and real oil prices changes (roilp). 6
The full sample comprises quarterly observations for the 1975:II{2006:IV period. Our
main results examine the post-war period (1989:I{2006:IV) and for the robustness
check, we compare these results with the pre-war period (1975:II{1988:IV). Further-
more, to take into account the e®ects of the Iranian revolution (1979), the Iraq-Iran
war (1980{1988), the Iraq-Kuwait war (1990), the ¯nancial crisis of South East Asia
(1998), the terrorist attacks on the USA (2001) and the Iraq war (2003), we have
employed ¯ve dummy variables. For more details on the dummy variables, refer to
appendix B. Seasonal dummies are used in all speci¯cations of VARs to control
for probable seasonalities in our variables. All variables except for in°ation are in
logarithmic form.
The proper de¯nition of applicable oil prices is a challenging task. We use oil prices
in real terms, taking the ratio of the average world nominal oil price in US dollars to
the US Consumer Price Index extracted from IFS online database. In our analysis,
we make use of symmetric oil price growth rates as well as of Mork's asymmetric
de¯nition of oil price changes. In the second speci¯cation, we distinguish between
the positive rate of quarterly changes (roilp+) and the negative rate of quarterly
changes (roilp-). 7
3.2 Empirical methodology
To investigate the response of macroeconomic variables to symmetric and asym-
metric innovations in oil prices, we use an unrestricted vector autoregressive model
(VAR). The VAR model provides a multivariate framework where changes in a par-
ticular variable (oil price) are related to changes in its own lags and to changes in
other variables and the lags of those variables. The VAR treats all variables as jointly
endogenous and does not impose a priori restrictions on structural relationships. Be-
6 The de¯nitions of the variables and the data sources are presented in the appendix A.
7 Cf. equation (1) and (2) for a technical description. Hamilton's asymmetric speci¯cation
cf. equation (3) and equation (4) is used for robustness tests in section 4.3.
10cause the VAR expresses the dependent variables in terms of predetermined lagged
variables, it is a reduced-form model. Once the VAR has been estimated, the relative
importance of a variable in generating variations in its own value and in the value
of other variables can be assessed (Forecast Error Variance Decomposition (VDC)).
VDC assesses the relative importance of oil price shocks in the volatility of other
variables in the system. The dynamic response of macroeconomic variables to inno-
vations in a particular variable (e.g., here oil prices and oil market) can also be traced
out using the simulated responses of the estimated VAR system (Impulse Response
Functions (IRF)). Thus, the IRF allows us to examine the dynamic e®ects of oil price
shocks on the Iranian macroeconomy. Our unrestricted vector autoregressive model
of order p is presented in equation (5):
yt = A1yt + ::: + Apyt¡p + Bzt + "t (5)
where yt is a vector of endogenous variables, zt is a vector of exogenous variables, Ai
and B are coe±cient matrices and p is the lag length. In this study, we have selected
lag 4 for the pre-1989 and for the post-1989 sample and lag 8 for the full sample.
The innovation process "t is an unobservable zero-mean white noise process with a
time invariant positive-de¯nite variance-covariance matrix. In our unrestricted VAR
models, the vector of endogenous variables, according to our ¯rst Cholesky ordering,
consists of real oil price (roilp, roilp+, roilp-), real government expenditures (rgex),
real industrial GDP per capita (rgdpi), in°ation (inf ), real e®ective exchange rate
(reex), and real import (rimp):
yt = [roilp;rgex;rgdpi;inf;reex;rimp]: (6)
The innovations of current and past one-step ahead forecast errors are orthogonalised
using Cholesky decomposition so that the resulting covariance matrix is diagonal.
This assumes that the ¯rst variable in a pre-speci¯ed ordering has an immediate
impact on all variables in the system, excluding the ¯rst variable and so on. In fact,
pre-speci¯ed ordering of variables is important and can change the dynamics of a
VAR system. The vector of exogenous variables is given by:
zt = [constant;Q1;Q2;Q3;D1;D2;D3;D4;D5]: (7)
where Q1-Q3 refers to seasonal dummies and D1-D5 refers to all other important
exogenous events during 1975{2006. The details behind the coding of dummies are
given in appendix B.
In the ¯rst set of ordering, the real oil price changes are ranked as a largely exoge-
11nous variable, especially for the case of Iranian economy. Although Iran is one of
the key suppliers of crude oil to global markets, its production and export quota are
predetermined by the OPEC criteria, domestic consumption and investment in oil
¯elds. Furthermore, demand for crude oil is largely determined by global economic
growth, energy intensity within industrialized economies, speculator operations in
oil markets, expectations of other key oil producers about current and future de-
velopments of the market, international oil companies' decisions on liquidation of
their stocks and ¯nally, the policy of key oil consumers on strategic petroleum re-
serves. Therefore, oil prices are an exogenous factor for the Iranian economy. We
expect that signi¯cant shocks in oil markets a®ect contemporaneously the other key
macroeconomic variables in the system.
The second variable in the ordering is government expenditures. Government ex-
penditures can be broadly de¯ned as current and capital consumptions. Current
expenditures cover recurrent expenditures (e.g., payments of governmental employ-
ees, subsidies, and so on.), whereas capital expenditures aim to add, rather than
maintain, the physical and material assets of an economy. A pattern that has been
observed since 1970 in Iran is the large and growing wage bill, which re°ects the trend
and magnitude of current expenditures of state. The dominant role of the government
in the economy, especially since the Islamic Revolution in 1979 and the large initial
nationalization caused a great over-employment in the government sector. Subsidies
also play an important role in the size and in°exibility of current expenditures in
Iran. The government, as a main recipient of oil rents, tries to distribute some part
of rent through di®erent kinds of subsidies. The magnitude of explicit budgetary
subsidies is not large by international standards, but there are substantial implicit
subsidies in the form of free or blow-cost provision of government services such as
utilities, education, health, transport and inputs for speci¯c sectors. These implicit
subsidies cover consumption of petroleum products and long-term loans. Most of
these expenditures re°ect themselves in current payments. The average share of cur-
rent expenditures for the period of 1970{2006 is 71%, whereas the average of capital
expenditures over the same period is 29%. The in°exible structure of government
expenditure ranks it largely as an exogenous variable in our ¯rst ordering.
Industrial production is also a®ected instantly by the level of government demand.
The industry production per capita as a proxy for real income per capita 8 feeds into
changes in in°ation. The positive development in oil prices, which results in higher
levels of government expenditures and income per capita, pushes the e®ective demand
8 Selecting industrial output per capita designed to analyze the e®ects of oil price shocks
on real economic activity. The literature also uses industrial production as suggested by
Bernanke and Mihov (1995), Kim and Roubini (2000), Wong (2000) and Papapetrou (2001)
for analyzing the e®ects of oil shocks.
12upward. Furthermore, the limited capacity of domestic supply and ine±ciencies as
well as time lags in response to increased demand may push the general consumer
prices upward, fueling in°ation.
Increasing in°ation appreciates the real e®ective exchange rate. The real exchange
rate measures the relative price of non-tradable goods to tradable ones and is a
measure of the competitiveness of an economy. The real e®ective exchange rate is a
weighted real exchange rate index, with the weights assigned to trading partners of
the local economy. If domestic prices increase, while prices abroad remain unchanged,
this would increase the relative prices of non-tradeables and the competitiveness of an
economy will fall. Finally, we have allowed that a shock in real e®ective exchange rate
contemporaneously a®ects real imports in Iran. As explained earlier, any signi¯cant
developments in exchange rate markets a®ect the competitiveness of Iranian products
and foreign trade, as well. 9
Another debatable point concerns use of VAR model in levels or in ¯rst di®erences.
If all used variables follow a I(0) process, the speci¯cation in levels is appropriate.
However, as most time-series variables have the problem of non-stationarity, the
question of di®erencing arises. According to Hamilton (1994), one option is to ignore
the non-stationarity altogether and simply estimate the VAR in levels, relying on
standard t- and F- distribution for testing any hypotheses. In Hamilton's words,
this strategy has three commendable features: "(1) The parameters that describe
the system's dynamics are estimated consistently. (2) Even if the true model is a
VAR in di®erences, certain functions of the parameters and hypothesis tests based
on a VAR in levels have the same asymptotic distribution as would estimates based
on di®erenced data. (3) A Bayesian motivation can be given for the usual t- or F-
distributions for test statistics even when the classical asymptotic theory for these
statistics is non-standard." (Hamilton (1994), p. 652). The other option is to di®er-
ence any apparently non-stationary variables before estimating the VAR. If the true
process is a VAR in di®erences, then di®erencing should improve the small sample
performance. The drawback to this approach is that the true process may not be
a VAR in di®erences. Some of the series may in fact have been stationary, or per-
haps some linear combinations of the series are stationary, as in a cointegrated VAR.
According to Hamilton (1994), in such circumstances, a VAR in di®erenced form is
mis-speci¯ed. The case of losing useful information by di®erencing, while there are
cointegration vectors in the system, is also argued by Sims (1980) and Doan (1992).
9 As robustness tests, we have carried out VAR Granger Causality Block Exogeneity
Wald Tests (see Granger (1969)) for alternative ordering of variables. The three alter-
native Cholesky orderings on the base of mentioned test are as follow: A.[roilp, reex, inf,
rimp, rgdpi, rgex], B.[roilp+, reex inf, rgdpi, rimp, reex, rgex] and C.[reex, rimp, roilp-, inf,
rgdpi, rgex].
13The other area of debate is whether an unrestricted VAR should be used where the
variables in the VAR are cointegrated. There is a body of literature that supports
the use of a vector error correction model (VECM), or cointegrating VAR, in this
situation. It has been argued, however, that in the short term, unrestricted VAR
perform better than a cointegrated VAR or VECM. Naka and Tufte (1997) demon-
strated the advantages of unrestricted VAR by examining impulse response functions
in cointegrated systems. According to their analysis, a system of cointegrated vari-
ables is estimated either as a VAR in levels or as a VECM model, where the latter is
a restricted version of the former. If there is cointegration, imposing this restriction
will yield more e±cient estimates. However, in the short run, VEC estimates are
less accurate than those from a VAR. Their Monte Carlo analysis shows that the
loss of e±ciency from VAR estimation is not critical for the commonly used short
horizon. Besides Naka and Tufte (1997), other researchers like Engle and Yoo (1987),
Clements and Hendry (1995), and Ho®man and Rasche (1996) showed that an un-
restricted VAR is superior (in terms of forecast variance) to a restricted VEC model
on short horizons when the restriction is true.
As a ¯rst step we check the properties of the used variables in order to determine
the appropriate speci¯cation for VAR estimation. The order of integration for each
variable is determined using Augmented Dickey and Fuller (1979) and Phillips and
Perron (1988) tests. The results of these tests are reported in table C.1 in the ap-
pendix C. The ADF-tests and PP-tests indicate that the variables expressed in logs
are non-stationary. When all variables are ¯rst di®erenced, we ¯nd evidence that
all variables are stationary. Considering that the variables of the model follow a
I(1) process, we analyze in a second step whether there is a long run relationship
among these variables. To test this, we employ Johansen cointegration tests (see Jo-
hansen (1991, 1995)). In formulating the dynamic model for the test, the question
of whether an intercept and trend should enter the short- and/or long-run model is
raised (Harris (1995), p. 95). We used all ¯ve deterministic trend models considered
by Johansen (1995). The number of cointegrating relations from all ¯ve models, on
the basis of trace statistics and the maximal eigenvalue statistics using critical values
from Osterwald-Lenum (1992) at 5% level, are summarized in tables C.2 and C.3 in
the appendix C.
Considering the existence of long-term equilibrium relationships among non-sta-
tionary variables in the system and the mentioned debates about advantages and
drawbacks of di®erent VAR speci¯cations, we decide to employ an unrestricted VAR
system in levels. The optimal lag length is 4. The selected lag length is based on
di®erent criteria. 10 The results of IRFs and VDC analyses for symmetric and asym-
10 For details see table C.4 and table C.5 in appendix C.
14metric formations of real oil prices within the Iranian macroeconomy are presented
below.
4 Empirical results
4.1 Impulse response functions
To identify orthogonalised innovations in each of the variables and the dynamic
responses to such innovations, the variance-covariance matrix of the VAR was fac-
torized using the Cholesky decomposition method suggested by Doan (1992). This
method imposes an ordering of the variables in the VAR and attributes all of the ef-
fects of any common components to the ¯rst variable in the VAR system. An impulse
response function (IRF) traces the e®ects of a one-time shock to one of the inno-
vations on current and future values of the endogenous variables. If the innovations
"t are contemporaneously uncorrelated, the interpretation of the impulse response
is straightforward. The ith innovation "i;t is simply a shock to the ith endogenous
variable yi;t.
According to Runkle (1987), reporting impulse response functions without standard
error bars is equivalent to reporting regression coe±cients without t-statistics. As an
indication of signi¯cance, we have estimated 68% con¯dence intervals for the IRF's
(see Sims and Zha (1999)). These con¯dence bands are obtained from 1,000 Monte
Carlo simulations. The middle lines in the ¯gures represent the impulse response
function while the bars represent con¯dence intervals. In this regard, when the hor-
izontal line falls into the con¯dence interval, the null hypothesis - that there is no
e®ect of oil price shocks on other macroeconomic variables - cannot be rejected. Thus,
including the horizontal line for the particular time period obtained in this manner
is interpreted as evidence of statistical insigni¯cance (Berument and Ceylan (2005)).
To investigate the response of the Iranian macroeconomic variables, symmetric and
asymmetric real oil prices as shock variables have been utilized. Additionally we
include dummy variables to capture exogenous shocks and seasonal e®ects.
Figure 4 shows IRFs for one standard innovation in real oil price growth (in symmet-
ric de¯nition) for the period of 1989:I{2006:IV. The shocks in real oil price growth
signi¯cantly increase both real industrial GDP per capita and CPI in°ation for the
¯rst two quarters after the initial shock. Real government expenditures rise rapidly
and reached their maximum positive response to the initial oil price shock after the
5th quarter. This strong increase in government consumption increases aggregate
demand in the economy and, consequently, the general level of prices. The real im-
15Fig. 4. Impulse Response Functions for roilp
port responds signi¯cantly and reached its peak two quarters after the initial shock.
Considering the composite of imports in Iran since 1959, which include on average
60% for raw and intermediary materials, it would be natural to expect a signi¯-
cant response of industrial output to oil price shocks. The impulse response of the
real e®ective exchange rate suggests that, in the long-run, this variable reacts to a
symmetric shock in real oil price by appreciating. However, this appreciation is not
statistically signi¯cant. The signi¯cant real e®ective depreciation in the short run
(two quarters) could be explained by the fact that rising oil prices lead directly to
higher in°ation in the major trading partners of Iran via higher import prices, while
domestic prices of energy products are highly subsidized in Iran and are below global
market prices. However, in the medium- and long-run, the second round e®ects of
higher in°ation in Iran because of increasing nominal wages and wealth of citizens
appear to surpass the in°ation in trading partners, leading to a real appreciation of
the Iranian rial.
Figure 5 shows IRFs based on one standard deviation shock to positive changes in
real oil price for the period of 1989:I{2006:IV. The response of industrial output
per capita is clearly positive and lasted till the end of the period. Based on Monte
Carlo con¯dence bands, we can judge that its response is signi¯cant, especially for
the ¯rst six quarters after the shock. This con¯rms the stimulus e®ect of positive
oil price shocks on domestic industrial output. Using real GDP per capita instead
of industrial GDP per capita does not change the results. The real GDP per capita
16Fig. 5. IRF roilp+
also reacts positively and signi¯cantly, especially three to six quarters after the ini-
tial shock. 11 However, some of the stimulus e®ect of positive oil price shocks on
domestic production is o®set by appreciation of domestic currency. The response of
real e®ective exchange rate to asymmetric positive shocks on oil price is increasing
and statistically signi¯cant between the 4th and 7th quarters after initial shock. This
supports the presence of a Dutch disease syndrome. In°ation reacts positively to oil
price increases in the short run (two quarters).
The in°ationary e®ects of positive oil price shocks on the Iranian economy can be
explained through the AD-AS model. Increasing oil revenues contribute to higher
levels of government expenditures. Considering the dominant role of the government
in the domestic economy, which is beyond the budgetary expenditures 12 and in-
cludes great implicit expenditures (e.g., various energy subsidies, o®setting the state
companies' annual losses, etc.), current and capital expenditures of the government
will rise as oil revenues increase. Also, because of increased net foreign reserves of
the central bank, the money supply will increase. The increased money supply and
government expenditures will shift demand curve upward.
11 The results are available upon request.
12 The response of real government expenditures to positive oil price shocks is not statisti-
cally signi¯cant. However, this response does not re°ect all expenditures by the government
in Iran, but rather re°ects only the budgetary consumption. Part of this insigni¯cant re-
sponse may be explained by a new institutional design of OSF in 2000.
17At the same time, increasing oil prices and foreign exchange revenues lead to higher
volumes of imports. As the Iranian industrial output is highly dependent on imported
raw and capital intermediaries, the volume of domestic production will rise, shifting
the supply curve to the right. However, limited capacity of domestic industries and
ine±ciency of production technology impede the rapid adjustment of supply section
to increased demand. Furthermore, the international trade sanctions during the Iran-
Iraq war and the US trade sanctions in the most years after the war have increased
extra burden on limited production capacity. This circumstance restricts the shift of
the AS curve. Thus, the combination of movements of supply and demand curves
will increase the level of production and prices in the economy.
The other explanation for in°ationary e®ects of positive oil price changes in Iran is
through the Dutch disease phenomenon and within the "spending e®ects" as sug-
gested by Corden (1984). The "spending e®ect" happens because higher oil prices
lead to higher wages or pro¯ts in the oil related sectors, thus increasing aggregate ef-
fective purchasing power and demand in the economy. While the price of the tradeable
sector (oil and manufacturing) is exogenously determined in international markets,
the price of the non-tradeable sector, which includes services, is determined within the
domestic market. A component of increased demand is shifted to the non-tradeable
sector, causing push-demand in°ation in these sectors. In this case, we have assumed
the immobility between tradeable and non-tradeable sections. Therefore, we will not
face a transfer of workers toward the booming service section from the oil and manu-
facturing section. However, if we assume the mobility of labor forces in the economy,
the booming non-tradable section absorbs workers from oil industry and manufac-
turing sections, leading to an increase in wages in the tradable section as well. Since
prices in the tradable section are determined from outside of the domestic market,
their pro¯t margin will fall and they will be forced to downsize their operations. This
phenomenon is described by Corden (1984) as "indirect de-industrialization".
Real import response to a shock on positive changes in real oil prices is positive
and lasts until the end of period. The increasing response of real import for the ¯rst
quarters after initial shock is signi¯cantly di®erent from zero. The positive response
of real imports to positive oil price shocks act as a built-in stabilizer, mitigating the
in°ationary e®ects of increased money supply after positive oil price shocks. The
long-run decreasing trend, albeit not statistically signi¯cant, of CPI in°ation may
be due to increased import volumes.
Finally, the response of real government expenditure to a one standard deviation
shock to positive oil price changes is not signi¯cantly di®erent from zero. At ¯rst
glance, this might seem counter-intuitive. However, the Iranian policy of saving a
large part of the windfall oil revenues in an oil stabilization fund since 2000, and
18using them in part to ¯nance the capital expenditures and payment of external
debts, has been an e®ective mechanism for oil wealth management.
In ¯gure 6, we demonstrate the responses of variables to negative changes in real
oil prices. The response of the real e®ective exchange rate to a decreasing real oil
price is negative, reaching its minimum in the 4th quarter after the shock. This
negative response remains signi¯cantly di®erent from zero for the ¯rst nine quarters.
The signi¯cant reduction of the real e®ective exchange rate, which results in strong
depreciation of the rial, can be interpreted as a warning sign of currency crisis.
Following signi¯cant negative oil price shocks, government foreign exchange revenues
fall considerably. Thus, it will not be able to allocate enough resources to clear the
domestic exchange market and defend the ¯xed exchange rate. The depreciation of
the domestic currency makes foreign products more expensive by increasing import
prices. More expensive raw, intermediary, and capital imports will reduce real imports
and dampen the domestic industrial production.
As expected, the response of industrial output to a negative shock of real oil price
is negative and permanent. The response of this variable reached its minimum, on
average, after three quarters of initial shock. 13 Due to the fall of real e®ective ex-
change rate and foreign exchange reserves, the response of real imports to a shock
in negative oil price changes is also negative and lasts until the end of the period.
This negative response is signi¯cant for the ¯rst 10 quarters after the shock and
reaches to its minimum level, on average, in the 6th quarter. The response of in°a-
tion to decreasing oil prices is also interesting. In°ation responds again positively to
a negative oil price shock. After a shock in negative oil prices, in°ation reaches its
maximum in the second quarter and gradually decreases over the period of forecast-
ing. However, it remains above the base line until the end of the period. This positive
response is statistically signi¯cant for the ¯rst four quarters after the shock. When
oil revenues fall because of negative oil price shocks, the level of imported raw and
capital intermediaries, which is mainly ¯nanced through oil revenues, will decrease.
Thus, domestic production will decrease. This means a shift of the supply curve to
the left. Because of de¯cit spending through borrowing of the government from the
central bank (or recently withdrawals from oil stabilization accounts), which raise
the base money and money supply, the demand curve shifts to the right. A com-
bination of these two shifts in demand and supply curves leads to increased prices
and to a reduction of the production level in the economy. The economy su®ers from
in°ationary pressures with both positive and negative oil price shocks.
13 The same negative response to negative oil price shocks is considered by using real
GDP per capita. Again, on average, after three quarters from initial shock, this variable
experienced the largest fall and remained negative for the long-run with some adjustment
upward.
19Pressures due to a signi¯cant reduction in government oil revenues cause a short run
reduction of its real consumption, reaching its minimum, on average, in the third
quarter after a shock. This negative fall is statistically signi¯cant. However, rigidities
in the structure of current government expenditures and the high level of involvement
of the state within the domestic economy will adjust this fall in state consumptions
in the mid-run. Again, the establishment of the OSF has facilitated the ¯nancing
of budget de¯cits and government expenditures during negative developments of oil
market.
Fig. 6. IRF roilp-
4.2 Variance decomposition analysis (VDC)
The impulse response functions illustrate the qualitative response of the variables in
the system to shocks in real oil prices. We can also examine the forecasting error vari-
ance decomposition to determine the proportion of the movements in the time series
that are due to shocks in their own series as opposed to shocks in other variables,
including oil prices.
Table 3 demonstrates the variance decompositions of the VAR models. Both oil
price increases and decreases a®ect the volatility of the other variables in the model
to varying degrees. For °uctuations of in°ation, negative oil price shocks have a
stronger short and long run role compared to positive oil price shocks. While positive
20oil price shocks account for just 2% and 1% of variances of in°ation in the 1th and
12th quarters, respectively, negative oil price shocks explain about 5-8% of in°ation
°uctuations for the same period. This con¯rms again the high in°ationary pressures
of ¯nancing budget de¯cits during negative oil markets. The past innovations in
in°ation in both positive and negative oil price shocks explain more than 90% of the
variance of in°ation in the short-run (one quarter after shock). In both scenarios of
positive and negative oil price shocks, in the long-run (after 12 quarters from initial
shock), the real industrial GDP per capita accounts for much of the variance in
in°ation (about 20-24%). In both scenarios, real e®ective exchange rate °uctuations
also play a relative important role for in°ation variances (about 12% in the long-run).
Table 3
Variance decomposition of roilp+ and roilp-
Quarter inf+ inf- reex+ reex- rgex+ rgex- rimp+ rimp- roilp+ roilp- rgpdi+ rgpdi-
Variance decompositions of inf
1 95.37 91.87 0.00 0.00 2.47 3.03 0.00 0.00 2.10 5.09 0.07 0.01
4 86.67 73.51 1.19 0.87 6.19 8.32 0.78 0.88 1.13 11.84 4.04 4.56
8 55.56 49.43 8.03 7.75 11.44 13.51 1.90 4.22 1.12 7.78 21.95 17.51
12 49.71 44.03 11.61 11.93 10.32 11.70 3.35 4.69 1.01 7.61 23.99 20.04
Variance decompositions of reex
1 1.08 0.17 94.13 81.30 2.93 4.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 10.04 1.87 4.34
4 7.46 3.70 79.47 59.13 4.75 3.98 5.51 7.54 1.80 23.49 1.02 2.17
8 9.07 5.34 73.27 56.12 4.19 3.90 4.60 6.35 5.87 24.53 2.99 3.76
12 8.66 4.87 72.91 56.10 3.89 3.67 4.90 6.05 5.55 24.18 4.09 5.11
Variance decompositions of rgpdi
1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 6.11 4.13 0.00 0.00 0.92 2.91 92.97 92.96
4 1.43 0.83 7.05 5.16 6.05 5.01 5.85 5.43 8.01 7.32 71.61 76.25
8 1.21 0.66 5.61 3.79 4.45 3.78 3.25 3.21 6.45 7.67 79.24 80.88
12 1.01 0.63 4.92 3.38 3.37 3.09 2.62 2.74 5.76 7.63 82.31 82.52
Variance decompositions of rimp
1 3.80 4.53 1.47 3.53 1.57 2.15 77.32 70.66 0.23 4.99 15.60 14.14
4 2.83 4.21 8.47 5.62 2.38 2.35 60.07 58.07 8.04 6.63 18.02 21.14
8 2.38 3.28 13.79 7.72 2.95 3.34 50.87 45.30 8.86 11.99 21.14 25.90
12 2.05 2.85 14.57 7.87 2.95 3.20 45.08 39.71 9.45 13.73 25.90 32.63
Variance decompositions of rgex
1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 99.79 99.35 0.00 0.00 0.21 0.65 0.00 0.00
4 2.69 2.61 5.82 9.09 78.14 73.11 3.39 6.26 2.04 5.47 7.92 3.45
8 2.38 2.15 10.68 12.31 61.41 58.95 10.55 11.62 2.79 7.66 12.20 7.31
12 2.74 2.78 10.80 12.54 56.55 52.87 10.60 12.23 3.24 6.96 16.06 12.62
Note: The column (+) shows the VDC for positive oil price shocks and the column (-) shows the VDC for
negative oil price shocks.
The other important aspect of asymmetric oil shocks can be seen in its e®ects on real
e®ective exchange rate °uctuation. While positive oil shocks play almost no role on
variations in this variable immediately after the initial shock, negative oil shocks have
the largest e®ect in both the short- and long-term. Negative oil price shocks explain
21for about 10% of °uctuations in the real e®ective exchange rate for the ¯rst quarter
after shock, increasing to about 24% in the third year after the shock. This con¯rms
the detrimental role of negative oil price shocks on the real e®ective exchange rate.
When we examine the VDC of real e®ective exchange rate by including a positive
oil price shock, the direct role of oil price shocks transfers to in°ation. In fact, in the
positive scenario of oil price shocks, the total magnitude of in°ation over all periods
is doubled compared to the total in°ation due to negative shocks.
Again negative oil price shocks are stronger than positive shocks for explaining the
variances of real industrial GDP per capita in the short- and long-run. However
most of the °uctuations in industrial output per capita are explained by their own
past shocks. Negative oil price shocks compared to positive oil shocks have larger
explanatory e®ects for real imports °uctuations. This role increased gradually from
5% in the ¯rst quarter after shock to about 14% at the end of period.
The explanation for the majority of real import variances however, after its own
innovations, is °uctuations in the real industrial GDP per capita. This demonstrates
the close connection between domestic production and foreign trade section as a
provider of necessary inputs.
In both scenarios of positive and negative oil markets, real government expenditure
variances in the short run can be only explained by its own past innovation. This
illustrates the in°exible structure of state expenditures, which is due to the vast
role of the state in di®erent aspects of economy. Even in the long run, more than
half of the variance in government expenditures is explained by itself. However, once
again, the role of negative oil price shocks on the long-run °uctuations of government
expenditures are stronger than positive oil price shocks and account for about 7%.
4.3 Robustness tests
Alternative orderings
A debatable point in VAR analyses is the ordering of variables in the system. In
order to check the stability of our results, we reestimate IRFs with alternative order-
ings based on VAR Granger causality tests for asymmetric de¯nitions of oil prices
shocks. 14 The impulse responses obtained by innovation in positive oil price growth
in alternative ordering roilp+, reex, inf, rgdpi, rimp, rgex is comparable to the re-
sponses obtained using the ¯rst ordering. The only di®erence in this latter case is
14 The results for the IRFs with alternative ordering are reported in ¯gure D.1 and ¯gure
D.2 in appendix D.1.
22the signi¯cance of real government expenditures positive response in the ¯ve quar-
ters after initial positive oil price shocks. The magnitude of this response is slightly
larger than the one that was obtained in the ¯rst ordering. The impulse responses
estimated by innovations in negative changes of oil prices in alternative ordering reex,
rimp, roilp-, inf, rgdpi is qualitatively and quantitatively similar to the ¯rst ordering.
The only exception is the response of real industrial output per capita, which is not
signi¯cant in the latter ordering.
Alternative oil price de¯nitions
A second debatable point is the proper de¯nition of oil price changes. For our ro-
bustness test we use the oil price de¯nition as suggest by Hamilton (1996) (compare
equations (3) and (4)). The use of this less volatile oil price shock de¯nition only
slightly changes the results. For positive oil price changes, the signi¯cance of the
responses is similar to the responses obtained by using Mork's (1989) de¯nition. The
negative de¯nition of oil price changes, which we have constructed on the basis of
Hamilton (1996) formulation of positive changes, leads to di®erent results. The re-
sponse of in°ation to negative changes of oil prices is still positive for two quarters
after the shock. However, in this alternative negative oil price shock de¯nition, the
negative response of in°ation for the period between the 6th and the 12th quarter is
statistically signi¯cant. Besides that, we have not found signi¯cant responses from
real e®ective exchange rate and real import in this case. This is contrary to the ex-
pected responses that we observed on the basis of Mork's de¯nition of negative oil
price shocks. The results for the alternative de¯nition of oil price shocks are reported
in ¯gure D.3 and D.4 in the appendix D.2.
The pre-1989 period
In order to compare the structural di®erences of the Iranian economy before and after
the ¯rst Persian Gulf (Iran-Iraq) war, we take the year 1988 (the end of the war)
as a breakpoint. It is important to note that estimating the pre-1988 VAR model
is challenging due to the lack of quarterly data for industrial GDP, imports, and
government expenditures. The quarterly data of mentioned variables are interpolated
from annual observations (for details see Karimi (2005)). Because of data quality
issues, the interpretation of the pre-1988 results should be carried out with cautious.
We examine the e®ects of oil price shocks for the period of 1975:II{1988:IV. The
symmetric oil price shocks do not show a signi¯cantly di®erent pattern of a®ects on
variables compared with the post-1989 period.
Regarding the response of other variables to a one standard deviation shock to pos-
itive oil price innovations, we observe some similarities and di®erences between the
23two sub-periods. The response of real industrial GDP per capita is positive and
reached its maximum, on average, in the 4th quarter after the shock, while this max-
imum happened in the 3rd quarter during the post-1989 period. The second di®erence
is the magnitude of real output response. The size of the response in the pre-1989
period is smaller than in the post-1989 period. This may indicate increased depen-
dency of industrial production on shocks in global oil markets through °uctuations
in imported inputs and intermediaries for the post-1988 period. The qualitative and
quantitative responses of real imports are similar in the post- and pre-1988 period.
It is positive and signi¯cant for the ¯ve quarters after shock. The third di®erence is
the response of real government expenditures, which is increasing and statistically
signi¯cant for the ¯rst four quarters after the initial positive oil shock. We did not
identify such a positive response for the post-1988 period. Positive oil price shocks
demonstrate their in°ationary nature for pre-1988 period. This positive response is
only signi¯cant in the short run. When we use real GDP per capita instead of real
industry GDP per capita for the pre-1988 period, the response of this variable to
positive oil price shocks is e®ectively zero.
The full sample
In this section, we estimate the VAR model for the full sample (1975: II{2006: IV). 15
Innovations in positive oil price growth cause signi¯cant and positive responses in real
e®ective exchange rates and real imports. The real e®ective exchange rate reaches
its maximum in the 6th quarter after the shock. Contrary to the post-1989 period,
during which positive oil price shocks increased real industrial output, the response
is not signi¯cant for the full sample. The in°ation response is only signi¯cant in
the long run (12 quarters) and negative. Increased real imports may act as a built-in
stabilizer in the long run, reducing in°ationary pressures. The response of government
expenditures to positive oil price shocks is also slightly signi¯cant in the long run.
In considering the negative oil price shocks, we observe that in the long run (12
quarters) the trend of decreasing real output reverses and is a signi¯cantly positive
response by the end of the period. The depreciation of real e®ective exchange rate
might bene¯t the real output of the economy in the long run by increasing compet-
itiveness of Iranian non-oil products in the global markets.
Another di®erent result for the full sample can be observed in the response of in°ation
to negative oil price shocks. It is negative and signi¯cant in the short- and medium-
term, which is also statistically signi¯cant. The reduction of real e®ective exchange
rate, while assuming the foreign prices of major trading partners are constant, can
15 The IRFs for the full sample are reported in ¯gure D.5 and ¯gure D.6 in the appendix
D.3.
24happen by depreciation of nominal exchange rate or reduction of in°ation by imple-
menting concretionary monetary policies. The Iranian government tried to support
the over-valued domestic currency for almost the entire duration of the study. The
uni¯cation of exchange rates that followed a considerable depreciation of the rial
against the US dollar in 2002 was a breakpoint. Thus, the remaining channel for
decreasing real e®ective exchange rate can be through the reduction the domestic
in°ation.
Rolling bivariate VARs
An alternative approach to analyzing possible changes in the macroeconomic e®ects
of oil price shocks over time is the use of rolling bivariate VARs. This approach allows
for a gradual change in the estimated e®ects of oil price shocks, without imposing
a discrete break in a single period. 16 The estimation of bivariate IRFs is based on
a series of dynamic equations and examines a variable of interest by looking at its
own past lags as well as the current and lagged values of oil price changes. We use
this approach by applying a moving window of 41 quarters, with the ¯rst moving
window centered in 1982. After estimating the ¯rst IRF we shift the sample period
four quarters forward and iterate the VAR estimation. The outcome of this is a series
of 22 bivariate IRFs over the full sample. The formulation of the rolling VARs is as
follows (for more details see Blanchard and Gali (2007)):






¯jroilpt¡p + "t (8)
where yt is the variable of interest and roilpt describes the oil price variable in di®er-
ent de¯nitions. In comparison to our multivariable approach in the previous section,
the proper identi¯cation of oil price shocks is less con¯dent in the bivariate model,
given the low dimension speci¯cation of the economy's dynamics. The advantage of
the bivariate VAR speci¯cation is the possibility of using shorter samples and, hence,
being able to obtain rolling IRFs (see Blanchard and Gali (2007)).
In the following, we focus on the dynamic rolling responses of real e®ective exchange
rate, in°ation, and real industrial GDP per capita to positive and negative oil price
shocks. The similar dummy variables in pervious analyses of multivariate VARs are
used here too.
Figure 7 displays the rolling IRFs for the real e®ective exchange rate. The reex ap-
pears to be much more sensitive to positive oil price shocks in recent years (especially
16 We would like to thank the referrers for suggesting this point.
25in the late 1990s and early 2000s). Real e®ective exchange rate appreciated two to
four quarters after shock by 0.05 percentage point after one positive standard de-
viation shock to oil prices in the early 2000s. This re°ects the higher risk of Dutch
disease in recent years for the Iranian economy. Negative oil price shocks also caused
domestic currency to fall over the total period under study. However, this negative
decrease of domestic currency was much stronger pre-1989 than post-1989.
Fig. 7. Bivariate responses of real e®ective exchange rate
The positive response of real industrial output per capita to positive oil price shocks
increased gradually over the total period (see ¯gure 8). This rise is more obvious
in recent years. It reached its maximum in the late 1990s. However, the long- run
responses of this variable became weaker in recent years.
The negative response of real industrial GDP per capita to negative oil price shocks
is stronger in the late 1980s. It seems that before the 1980s, decreasing oil prices by
reducing government revenues and increasing the import prices through exchange
rates was an extra burden on domestic production, especially during the eight years
war with Iraq. In recent years, decreasing oil prices by reducing e®ective exchange
rate and improving terms of trade (through increased non-oil exports) o®set, to some
extent, the increased import prices of required inputs for industrial production.
Figure 9 shows the rolling responses of the Iranian in°ation rate to asymmetric oil
price shocks. The response of in°ation to positive oil price shocks over the period is
positive, at least for the short- and medium-run. This response, however, seems to be
stronger in the late 1980s. In particular, in the period centered in 1988, the response
of in°ation to one standard deviation positive shock to oil prices is three percentage
points. The in°ationary e®ects of positive oil price shocks in recent years have become
weaker compared to the late 1980s. In recent years, considerable volumes of imports
26Fig. 8. Bivariate responses of industrial GDP per capita
have had a role as built-in stabilizers for containing the in°ationary pressures of petro
dollars in the economy. The response of in°ation to negative oil price shocks, however,
shows us another side of coin. The in°ationary e®ects of reduced oil revenues, and
consequently huge budget de¯cits for which the solution often involves asking the
state to cover these de¯cits, have led to much stronger responses in the recent years
than in the late 1970s.
Fig. 9. Bivariate responses of In°ation
5 Conclusions
Much of the research on the oil{gdp relationship has concentrated on developed oil
importing economies. A formal study on the impact of oil price shocks on macroe-
27conomic variables in an oil exporting country such as Iran is still lacking. One of
the main challenges of such studies is the lack of reliable high frequency data on
aggregate macroeconomic variables. In this study, we mainly focused on the post
Iran-Iraq war period. We also tried to compare the main results from the post-war
period with those from the pre-war period, which spanned from 1975 to 1988. More-
over, we estimated rolling bivariate VARs for in°ation, output, and real e®ective
exchange rates.
The empirical ¯ndings of this study suggest that positive oil price shocks increase
the real e®ective exchange rate and appreciate domestic currency in mid run, which
is one of the syndromes of a Dutch disease. This reduces the price of imports and
increases the price of exports. Real imports and domestic output per capita increase
signi¯cantly and we are only able to observe the initial in°ationary e®ects of posi-
tive oil shocks. Real government expenditures also only increase in the mid-run and
are marginally signi¯cant. The e®ects of the oil stabilization fund for mitigating in-
°ationary e®ects of a positive shock and protecting the annual state budgets from
external shocks should be important.
The Iranian economy is much more vulnerable to the negative shocks of oil prices. The
real e®ective exchange rate falls signi¯cantly (domestic currency depreciates) until
the end of the period (12 quarters). This is a warning sign of a potential currency
crisis after negative price shocks in oil markets. This depreciation increases the price
of imports, and despite the traditional approach, which welcomes this event because
of improving non-oil exports, our analysis for the case of Iran shows the opposite
e®ects. The real output, which depends heavily on imported raw and intermediary
materials, will be forced to downsize. In°ationary e®ects are much more pronounced
during negative shocks. This is mainly because of increased import prices and the
mechanism of ¯nancing budget de¯cits in Iran. Government expenditures initially fall
signi¯cantly but increase beyond the base line after ¯ve quarters of initial shock. This
demonstrates the sticky structure of government expenditures in Iran. The reduction
of government expenditures following negative oil shocks cannot be permanent.
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A Data sources and description
We use quarterly data for the period of 1975:II to 2006:IV. The variables considered
in this paper are as follow:
² Real industrial production per capita (rgdpi)
The variable measures industrial value added in GDP per capita. This variable is
before seasonal adjustment and is at constant prices of 1997. The source of this
variable is the online portal of time series at the Central Bank of Iran.
² Real e®ective exchange rate (reex)
This variable is the nominal e®ective exchange rate index of the Rial adjusted for
in°ation rate di®erentials with the countries whose currencies comprise the trade
basket. Real e®ective exchange rate is de¯ned such that an increase means a real
appreciation of the currency considered. An appreciation of the real exchange rate is
expected to hurt the country's external competitiveness and vice versa for decreasing
it. The (reex) series has extracted from the IFS online database.
² In°ation (inf )
31This variable is the yearly changes in the Iranian consumer prices and has been
extracted from IMF via Datastream.
² Real public consumption expenditure (rgex)
This variable is non-seasonally adjusted of public consumptions of Iran on the base
of constant prices of 1997, extracted from the Central Bank of Iran online database.
² Real imports (rimp)
This variable is non-seasonally adjusted data of the Iranian imports on the base of
constant prices of 1997, extracted from the Central Bank of Iran online database.
² Real oil price (roilp)
This variable is the quarterly nominal average of world oil prices de°ated by the US
consumer price index. The price series is extracted from the IFS online database.
B Coding of the dummy variables D1-D5
² D1{Iranian revolution and the Iraq-Iran war, 1979:I{1988:III
This period cover a military con°ict and therefore a strong presence of state in the
economy. Nearly all the key markets and price mechanism were administered by the
government.
² D2{Iraq-Kuwait war, 1990:I-1990:IV
This con°ict, known as the ¯rst Gulf war, started in 1990 and ended in 1991. The
movement of oil prices in 1990/1991 was erratic, with crude price increasing by
160.1% over the war period.
² D3{South East Asian ¯nancial crisis, 1997:III-1998:IV
The severe economic collapse after mid-1997 greatly reduced growth in energy con-
sumption. Gas demand growth was 2.3%, compared to the pre-crisis rates of more
than 5%. The impact on oil demand was even more dramatic {rather than grow-
ing by the pre-crisis expectation of 1.0 MMbpd/yr, demand in 1998 declined by 0.5
MMbpd/yr{ the ¯rst decline since 1985. The powerful negative shock also sharply
reduced the price of oil, which reached a low of US$8 per barrel towards the end
of 1998, causing a ¯nancial shock in OPEC nations, including Iran and other oil
32exporters.
² D4{September 11, 2001:III{2002:II
In the month following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, oil prices declined
to a two year low of US$17.50 per barrel due market concerns regarding a possible
slowdown in the United States and the global economy. The decision by OPEC to
cut crude oil exports and signs of a more robust global recovery contributed to oil
price quickly returning to pre-September 11 levels in early 2002.
² D5{Iraq-US war, 2003:I{2003:IV
Prices spike on Iraq war due to rapid demand increases, constrained OPEC capacity,
low inventories, and so on.
C Stationarity, cointegration, and optimal lag length tests
C.1 Stationarity tests
Table C.1 reports the ADF tests and the Philips-Perron tests for the stationary of
each variable, over sample period 1989:I to 2006:IV. We applied models with and
without trend. For the log-level series, the ADF test (Dickey and Fuller (1979)) does
not reject the null hypothesis of a unit root at 95% con¯dence level. However, the
Phillips-Perron tests (Phillips and Perron (1988)) reject the null hypothesis of a
unit root (nonstationary) at the 99% con¯dence level for the case of rgex and rimp.
After ¯rst di®erencing, each series rejects the null hypothesis of nonstationary at the
99 or 95% levels. Relying on ADF tests, all variables have unit root in levels and
are stationary after ¯rst di®erencing. Since all the series are nonstationary at the
levels and integrated of the same order, this suggests a possibility of the presence of
cointegrating relationship between oil prices and the Iranian economic variables.
C.2 Johansen cointegration tests
The Johansen cointegration test is carried out to test for cointegrating relationships
among real oil prices and the ¯ve Iranian macroeconomic variables. The exogenous
dummy variables are also included. Prior to performing the Johansen cointegration
test, variables are entered as levels into a VAR to determine the optimal number of
lags needed in the cointegration analysis. Three criterions, the Akaike information
33Table C.1
Tests for unit roots (with non seasonal adjusted data)
ADF PP
without trend with trend without trend with trend
variables level ¯rst di®. level ¯rst di®. level ¯rst di®. level ¯rst di®.
rgdpi ¡0:66 ¡4:60¤¤¤ ¡3:00 ¡5:14¤¤¤ ¡:91 ¡15:4¤¤¤ ¡2:07 ¡16:0¤¤¤
rgdp ¡2;85¤ ¡4:01¤¤¤ ¡2:18 ¡5:38¤¤¤ ¡3:06¤¤ ¡15:2¤¤¤ ¡3:03 ¡16:93¤¤¤
reex ¡1:33 ¡10:7¤¤¤ ¡2:01 ¡10:6¤¤¤ ¡1:36 ¡10:7¤¤¤ ¡2:04 ¡10:6¤¤¤
inf ¡3:05¤¤ ¡7:30¤¤¤ ¡3:05 ¡7:26¤¤¤ ¡3:18¤¤ ¡7:52¤¤¤ ¡3:17¤ ¡7:49¤¤¤
rgex ¡1:04 ¡17:1¤¤¤ ¡0:36 ¡17:5¤¤¤ ¡6:91¤¤¤ ¡36:8¤¤¤ ¡7:13¤¤¤ ¡39:5¤¤¤
rgexs ¡0:58 ¡6:58¤¤¤ ¡3:71¤¤ ¡6:59¤¤¤ ¡6:16¤¤¤ ¡26:6¤¤¤ ¡9:39¤¤¤ ¡26:4¤¤¤
rimp ¡2:01 ¡13:0¤¤¤ ¡1:60 ¡13:2¤¤¤ ¡3:76¤¤¤ ¡21:7¤¤¤ ¡3:76¤¤ ¡21:8¤¤¤
roilp ¡8:99¤¤¤ ¡9:03¤¤¤ ¡8:98¤¤¤ ¡8:98¤¤¤ ¡8:99¤¤¤ ¡27:6¤¤¤ ¡9:02¤¤¤ ¡27:4¤¤¤
roilp+ ¡7:94¤¤¤ ¡8:73¤¤¤ ¡7:95¤¤¤ ¡8:69¤¤¤ ¡7:86¤¤¤ ¡50:9¤¤¤ ¡7:86¤¤¤ ¡50:3¤¤¤
roilp¡ ¡9:81¤¤¤ ¡15:2¤¤¤ ¡9:76¤¤¤ ¡15:2¤¤¤ ¡9:82¤¤¤ ¡29:6¤¤¤ ¡9:78¤¤¤ ¡29:4¤¤¤
Notes: Sample is 1975:II-2006:IV for the variables in levels, and starts one quarter later for variables in ¯rst
di®erences. We use the Schwarz Info Criterion for lag length selection. The maximal allowed number of lags was
12. We denote with */**/*** the rejection of the null hypothesis of an unit root at a 10/5/1 percent signi¯cance
level.
criterion (AIC), Final Prediction Error (FPE) and the likelihood ratio (LR) test are
applied to determine the optimal lag length.
Table C.2
Cointegrating 1
Data Trend None None Linear Linear Quadratic
Test type No Intercept Intercept Intercept Intercept Intercept
No Trend No Trend No Trend Trend Trend
Trace 3 3 2 2 3
Maximum
eigenvalue
2 2 2 2 3
Notes: Selected number of cointegrating vectors (roilp+, (Mork), 1989:I{2006:IV, number of lags:
4, exogenous variables: Q1, Q2, Q3, D2, D3, D4, D5)
Table C.3
Cointegrating 2
Data Trend None None Linear Linear Quadratic
Test type No Intercept Intercept Intercept Intercept Intercept
No Trend No Trend No Trend Trend Trend
Trace 3 4 4 5 4
Maximum
eigenvalue
3 3 3 3 3
Notes: Selected number of cointegrating vectors (roilp-, (Mork), 1989:I{2006:IV, number of lags:
4, exogenous variables: Q1, Q2, Q3, D2, D3, D4, D5)
34C.3 Optimal lag length
Table C.4 and C.5 reports the results for the optimal lag length test.
Table C.4
VAR Lag order selection criteria, roilp+
Lag LogL LR FPE AIC
0 -132.66 NA 6.12e-06 5.02
1 127.95 419.88 1.22e-08 -1.22
2 172.50 64.35 1.03e-08 -1.46
3 222.21 63.51 7.86e-09 -1.84
4 276.32 60.12* 5.78e-09* -2.34*
* indicates lag order selected by the criterion, LR: sequential modi¯ed
LR test statistic (each test at 5% level), FPE: Final prediction error,
AIC: Akaike information criterion
Table C.5
VAR Lag order selection criteria, roilp-
Lag LogL LR FPE AIC
0 -132.57 NA 6.11e-06 5.02
1 129.39 422.05 1.18e-08 -1.26
2 180.77.41 74.21 8.15e-09 -1.69
3 236.51 71.22 5.28e-09 -2.24
4 296.99 67.20* 3.25e-09* -2.92*
* indicates lag order selected by the criterion, LR: sequential modi¯ed
LR test statistic (each test at 5% level), FPE: Final prediction error,
AIC: Akaike information criterion
35D Robustness tests
D.1 Alternative VAR orderings
Fig. D.1. IRF roilp+, alternative ordering
Fig. D.2. IRF roilp-, alternative ordering
36D.2 Hamilton's oil prices
Fig. D.3. IRF roilp+, in Hamiltons de¯nition
Fig. D.4. IRF roilp-, in Hamiltons de¯nition
37D.3 The full sample
Fig. D.5. IRF roilp+, full sample
Fig. D.6. IRF roilp-, full sample
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